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In March 1975, a radical Land Reform Bill (LRB) was
proclaimed in Ethiopia by a group of young military
officers, NCOs and enlisted men (the 120-member
Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces,
known as DERG) who had taken over state power on
12 September 1974 at the head of the popular
movement of the February (1974) Revolution which
overthrew a 2,000-year-old monarchy.
The basic provisions of the Bill were as follows:
- it abolished private property in rural land without
compensation;
- the sale, mortgaging, lease or exchange of land
were prohibited to prevent the reproduction of
class relations based on property;
- it abolished all exploitation in agriculture (land-
lord-tenant relationships, wage-labour except for
state farms and disabled persons) and money-
lending;
- it abolished all land-based litigations in the judicial
system (40 per cent of all court cases) and set up
separate mass-based tribunals under the peasant
associations with only one court of appeal as
opposed to more than half a dozen during the
monarchy;
- every working person was promised up to 10
hectares of arable land and the principle of equal
distribution of land was proclaimed as well as the
abolition of gender discrimination in land rights;
- it abolished the peasantry's debt to money-lenders,
landlords, etc;
- it nationalised all large-scale capitalist farms and
their machinery; about a third of them were
distributed to evicted tenants and other landless
groups.
It also declared the formation of producer and other
cooperatives among the peasantry and allowed the
formation of peasant associations (PAs) at local and
regional levels from which landlords and other
exploiting elements were barred from joining for at
least a year. PAs were to be popular bodies for the
implementation of the bill [POMOA 1976:181.'
Related bilis included the PAs Organisation and Consolidation Bill
(14/12/75) (henceforth called Consolidation Bill), Agrarian Tax Bill
(4/1/76), Producer Cooperative Guidelines (June 1979), National
Peasant Association laws (September 1977), Nationalisation of large
industries, banking, insurance, urban land and housing (January-July
1975), state monopolies on major internal and external trade and a
Nalional Democratic Revolution programme with a declared
intention of a transition to socialism.
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Until PAs were set up and undertook land
redistribution, every former tenant was to retain right
of possession over land he or she tilled. Right to retain
agricultural implements and a pair of oxen belonging
to the landlord (the latter to be paid for over a three-
year period) was also guaranteed. The PA Consoli-
dation Bill (December 1975) defined their functions as
securing and safeguarding the political, economic and
social rights of the peasantry, exercising self-rule,
enabling the peasantry to participate in the struggle
against feudalism and imperialism and for socialism:
and creating organisations among the peasantry
(women's associations, militia, units of production,
consumption, etc).
The PAs consisted of a general assembly of all
registered members which elected a nine-person
executive committee. In turn, the committee elected a
20-person defence squad; a five-person tribunal was
also independently elected by the Assembly. Legis-
lative, executive and judicial functions overlapped and
in most cases the executive tended to replace both the
tribunal and the assembly.
Each PA was supposed to be set up at the local level on
an area of 800 hectares, theoretically involving 400
persons (about 80 families). In reality, it varied
between one or two hundred people in some areas and
thousands in others. The Bill made provisions for
district (Wereda) and county (Awraja) associations
and a later proclamation in September 1977 extended
this to provincial and national levels. By the end of
1976, 21,501 PAs had been set up in all provinces
(except Eritrea) with the help of some 50,000 students
and teachers sent to the rural areas to participate in a
Development Campaign (Zemet cha) and also with the
efforts of the district land reform officers of the
Ministry of Land Reform. Most of these (about
18,000) were set up in the first three months after the
LRB proclamation. By the end of 1978, this figure had
risen to 25,583 with 7,275,507 members, including
Eritrea [Mulugetta Bezabeh et al 1978:84].
The Bill is often cited as one of the most radical ever
declared. Among the reasons forwarded for such a
claim are the contents of the Bill itself, the opposition
of Chinese, Soviet and Western experts to it, the
implementation drive involving a mass campaign of
some 50,000 students and teachers and the violent
suppression of rebelling landlords, etc. Moreover, the
radicalism of the LR and related bills, and its impact
on the peasantry are made the basis for characterising
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the military regime in power as either socialist or a
'state of socialist orientation' [Molyneux and Halliday
1982]. Political forces opposed to the regime are either
labelled 'rightist' or 'ultra-left'. National liberation
struggles such as those waged in Eritrea, Oromia etc
are dismissed as secessionist and therefore 'reactionary'.
Eight years after the promulgation of this Bill,
however, a socialist agriculture has yet to emerge,
cooperatives account for less than one per cent of
agricultural production and 0.6 per cent of all farm
households, equal land distribution has been
abandoned, and the peasant associations have been
taken over by rich peasants and transformed into
organs of central state power with overlapping
interests between the two. Agricultural production has
shown no rise above population growth levels, famine
is still endemic and in general, the economic, political
and social impact of a radical land reform is nowhere
in evidence.
This article intends to inquire why a supposedly
'radical' land reform lost its impetus. Specifically, it
aims to clarify the political character of the LRB by
examining the PAs as the main vehicle of implement-
ation of the Bill. In examining the PAs, we should
focus on the questions of mass mobilisation and
participation, the exercise of real political power at
grass-roots, their relationship to the central state
structure, their class composition and their role in
promoting the interests of the peasantry. Did the PA
possess the degree of organisational autonomy
necessary to defend the interests of the pesantry? Such
an analysis of the PAs would also help us to
understand the real political dynamics of the land
reform as a whole, and assess the relationship between
its declared goals and its political results.
PAs and Land Redistribution
Initially, the most important activity of the PAs was
land distribution on behalf of the Ministry of Land
Reform whose inability to implement the law was one
of the main reasons for passing it over to the PAs. The
4 March Land Reform proclamation, through its
decree on the formation of PAs seemed to herald the
birth of a popular institution that would guarantee
new peasant land-holdings. What are the pre-
requisities for such an equal distribution and what
kinds of structure, methods and personnel are
required to move from redistribution to collectivi-
sation in a country where small-holder agriculture has
been dominant for several hundred, and, in some
cases, a thousand years? The source of land for
equalisation of holdings and the social basis of the
class to be dispossessed were of crucial importance.
The process of distribution involved two phases. First,
by abolishing tenancy and legitimising the holdings of
every tenant operator the Land Reform Bill abolished
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absentee landlordism, resident landlords, and rich
peasant holdings leased out to other tenants. This
process redistributed land to poor tenants with the
result that land was henceforth held by former tenants,
middle peasants and rich peasants only. In effect,
holdings of more than 10 hectares were abolished by
the bill and some holdings of more than five hectares
belonging to rich peasants but leased to tenants were
also confiscated since, given the prevailing technology,
a farmer could cultivate only about two to three
hectares, with another two to three left for grazing. Of
all the redistributive aspects of the LRB, this was
probably the least turbulent since it involved holdings
already operated by tenants, and the general
opposition of the landlords and rural gentry had been
broken.
The first phase of redistribution also included the
allocation of previously commercial farms or newly
converted state farms to landless tenants and other
landless people and agricultural labourers. About
54,500 hectares of such land had been distributed by
September 1975 [Ethiopian Herald, 13 September
1975]. The next phase of this policy would have
involved taking land from the rich peasants and giving
it to poor peasants and former tenants. This involved
land holdings of between five and ten hectares and in
some cases even less. The question thus arises: can the
poor peasants and former tenants overcome the rich
peasants? What would the role of the middle peasant
be?
In fact the rich peasants are relatively well organised,
armed, in control of the peasant associations and
enjoy cordial relations with the police and bureau-
cracy. To break rich peasant control of the PAs in the
Movement for autonomous and democratic Peasant Associations.
The suppression of this movement heralded the change in state policy
tnwards the neasants.
north and the axis of old rich peasants and old middle
peasants-turned-rich peasants in the south would
require a far greater social transformation in the
countryside than any that has taken place so far. It
would also require a network of rural party or cadre
organisations as has been the case in China or
Vietnam, and a class strategy like that of China. This is
a process of social revolution and on the central state
level it requires a broad social base involving all the
new democratic revolutionary forces and classes. In
Ethiopia, the military government opted for such a
policy in rhetoric, but in practice, five years after the
proclamation we find that the policy of 'equal land
distribution' has been abandoned [IBRD 1980].
As can be seen from Table 1, in 197 5-76 more than half
of the total number of holdings 52.2 per cent were less
than one hectare in size each; these accounted for only
18.2 per cent of the total area of holdings. This picture
had not changed much by 1976-77 when 48.3 per cent
of holdings were still less than one hectare each and
accounted for only 17.4 per cent of the total area. On
the other hand, 24 per cent of the larger holdings
(above two hectares) accounted for nearly 60 per cent
of the total area of holdings.
The leadership of the PAs was taken over fully by the
rich peasant class (in the north) in alliance with the
upper middle peasants (in the south). Indeed, the June
1979 government guidelines on producers cooperatives
(PCG) declared 'the leadership positions of peasant
associations at the present time are occupied by rich
and middle peasants. . .'. By this time, five years after
the February revolution and four years after the LRB,
the majority of the peasantry, was disenchanted with
the state and was moving away from the idea of
collective farming.
Table I
Size of holdings 1974-77
year holdings under 1.00 ha
74-75 no ('000) 2064.0
% 50.01
75-76 no ('000) 2677.8
% 52.20
76-77 no ('000) 2237.4
48.25
Peasant Associations and the Struggle for
Autonomy
As with many institutions that were products of the
February 1974 Revolution, the PAs display varying
features which reflect the strategies of contending class
forces and their degree of organisational clarity at
different moments of the revolution. The original
authors of the Land Reform Bill were a radical group
of nine civilians in the Ministry of Land Reform, all of
whom have now been purged or exiled. In their draft
introduction to the constitution of the PAs, they stated
prophetically that the nature of state power and its
democratic basis were the decisive factors in
determining whether these associations would be
beneficial to the peasantry or not. Invoking the
example of Franco's Spain, where the peasant
committees formed during the Revolution were used
to control and suppress the revolutionary peasant
movement, they stressed that there was nothing
intrinsically popular in the PAs themselves unless the
upper reaches of state power were themselves the
expression of popular intervention - a warning later
deleted by the military regime.
After the proclamation of the Land Reform Bill,
implementation at the local level faced serious
opposition from landlords and local police forces.
However, in the south, the peasantry and radical
students in the Zemetcha combined to struggle against
the local gentry and police. During this heyday of mass
movements and radical policies, from March to June
1975, PAs and popular courts mushroomed. Landlords
were disarmed and economic assets confiscated in
some areas. At the height of the movement tens of
thousands of peasants carried out insurrections in
coordination with Zemetcha participants, teachers
and workers groups in provincial towns.
Source: Mulugetta Bezabih et aI, 1978, Agrarian Reform and Rural Development in Ethiopia, MOA/IDR, Addis Ababa, August, p
total holdings
4127.0
99.95
5129.3
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1.01.-5.00 5.01 andover
1822.0 239.0
44.15 5.79
2246.9 205.1
43.80 4.00
2227.8 172.2
48.04 3.71
Although the local police and state bureaucracy did
everything in their power to protect the landlords, the
weight of popular opposition and the confusion of
state policy militated against them. This situation was
drastically reversed by the military, starting with
events in the south-western provincial capital of
Jimma. Having realised the revolutionary implications
of the popular movements, a top level delegation led
by Major Sisay Habte launched a crackdown on the
leaders of the PAs and radical Zemet cha participants.
The state media launched a week of continuous
propaganda discrediting the intentions aiid actions of
the opposition. Many PAs with a radical past were
banned, and their leaders arrested; others were
forbidden to hold meetings.
The consolidation proclamation of the Bill on Rural
Land (14 December 1975) seemed to herald a change
of policy on the arming of the peasantry as it provided
for the formation of defence squads under the PAs to
be trained and armed by the government. But the
function of the Consolidation Bill was in effect to
negate the autonomy of the PAs by making them
subordinate extensions of the Ministry of Interior
below the district level through the creation of district
Revolutionary Administrative and Development
Committees to '. . . supervise the activities of peasant
associations and any association established by such
association within the Wereda' (article 47/4) [Bezabih
et al 1978]. Each committee was chaired by the chief
authority of the central government at the district
level, the district administrator (46/1), and dominated
by other central government officials at the district
level (such as the police chief). Peasant representation
was weak - three members as against six government
officials representing the central government. The
intensification of the wars waged by the liberation
movements in the second half of 1977 transformed the
role of PAs. The primary pre-occupation of the state
now became the recruitment of an army of hundreds
of thousands to suppress this explosion. PA defence
squads were rounded up to raise an army for the wars
in Eritrea and Ogaden. In fact, the PAs became the
instrument of mobilisation and recruitment for this
army. The severity of the manpower demands of the
war, the fate of the soldiers that entered this war
machine and the doubts about its justness among
broad setions of the oppressed classes soon alienated
the peasantry from the war. In consequence, the PAs
came to represent the insecurity of life instead of a
guarantee of newly acquired rights of land-holding.
Moreover, despite the legal proclamation of the lowest
ever level of taxation for the peasantry, the PAs were
transformed into a political instrument of massive
fund-raising for the state.
PAs have not been able to function as agents of self or
local government. They lack legislative powers even
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on internal matters and have no financial resources of
their own nor forms of taxation to raise funds for local
administrative or development projects - these
would be basic functions of any local government. The
executive function of the PAs consists in carrying out
central government decisions at the local level. They
cannot counterpose local interests versus the central
government, nor are they accountable to the local
population except in that local people elect them.
Indeed, in many ways the PAs are a great innovation
for the centralised state. First, they replace the
traditional representatives of the ancien regime at the
local level. Second, they are mass elected organs and
thus attain a popular legitimacy. They carry out all the
tasks of their predecessors and further they collect the
taxes of the central government: like the Chikkashum
the chairman of the PA can keep two per cent of the
taxes. They undertake to arrest all persons violating
the law and to hand over such persons to 'the
appropriate authorities' (Consolidation Bill, 2/11-1);
they carry out 'the necessary security and defence
activities according to the decision of the government'
(CB, 2/11/5); they follow land-use directives issued by
the government (LRB, 3/10/2) and 'administer and
conserve any public property within the area, especially
the soil, water and forest', (also wildlife) (LRB, 3/10/3),
mining lands, places of historical and antiquarian
significance (LRR/3/10/9); and in all their activities
which include 'the enforcement and execution of
relevant laws and government policies' (CB, 3/47/1)
they are to be supervised (CB, 4/47/4) by the district
administrator (CB/4/44/3 and 4b/a) and the district
police chief (CB/4/46/n). The district level PA is the
key point of linkage with the state apparatus. The PAs
above district level are ossified structures without any
functions for the people or the state since no real
decisions are taken at these levels [Mariam 1978].
Even judicial, tax collection, pension or land
distribution activities are non-existent at these levels
(though the Awraja has had some judicial functions).
These organisations are cosmetic in that they will only
contribute towards the growth of a peasant
aristocracy with membership dues collected by the
central government.
Conclusion
As institutions embodying elements of both the state
apparatus and the peasantry, with organisational
linkages to the state apparatus and the political
organisations of the class in power, PAs pose a
problem of identity. Whom and what do they
represent? What is their relationship to land reform, to
the state's declared intention of creating a socialist
agriculture, and to the aspirations of the peasantry for
land, equality, democracy and peace?
There is a clear incompatibility between their roles as
mass organisations and as organs of state admini-
stration. To further or defend the interests of their
members, such associations would need to have
considerable autonomy from hegemonic political
forces. The degree of this autonomy, together with the
level of internal democracy, determines whether these
bodies will defend the interests of the groups they are
designed to represent. In practice, this depends on the
members' consciousness of their own political, social
and economic interests.
The radicalism of the provisions of the land reform bill,
the success in the formal organisation of the peasantry
in PAs, and the abolition of the landlord class
obscures the real nature of these PAs. Appearing as
organs of self-rule, people's power and popular
economic bodies in a socialist framework, they have
been transformed into organs of central government
with law and order, revenue collection, security and
mobilisation functions. The participation and organi-
sation of women in PAs has been marginalised and a
de-politicisation of the peasantry has taken place with
the take-over by rich peasants of PA leadership. This
process is similar to what happened to the Ethiopian
working class after the promulgation of the labour
laws. The PAs cannot be taken as the expression ofthe
political power of the peasantry. The nature of the PA
is not determined by the body which has elected them
to power or the class origins of the PA officers but by
the nature of political power and hegemony at the level
of the central state apparatus of which the PAs are the
rural extension with very limited autonomy.
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